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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does an implied right to light, air or view exist in the State of Utah? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury that there is no implied 
right to light, air or view in the State of Utah? 
3. Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury on the question of nuisance 
as particularly affected by the spite fence doctrine? 
4* Can a court award damages or order injunctive relief against a property 
owner on grounds of nuisance where the fence or improvement is fully upon the property 
of the defendant and complies with applicable zoning regulations, unless the fence or 
improvement was erected solely for spite or malice against a neighbor? 
5* If a fence or other improvement is erected for the purpose of maintaining 
and protecting the privacy of a landowner, can damages be awarded for maintenance of 
the structure or can removal of the structure be compelled^ 
6, Did the court's failure to instruct the jury that no implied right to light, air 
or view exists improperly prejudice defendants' defense and right to a fair trial? 
7, Were the court's instructions on nuisance adequate to inform the jury of the 
law regarding spite fences or were the instructions so confusing and misleading as to 
prejudice defendants? 
8, Did the trial court improperly imply a right to light, air and view in 
plaintiffs in derogation of the common law, in determining that defendants breached the 
Settlement Stipulation between the parties? 
9, Did the court improperly exclude admissible evidence relevant to defendants' 
defenses, prejudicing defendants? 
10, Is the injunction granted by the trial court overbroad and does it violate due 
process of law by effectively establishing a light, air and view easement and thereby 
taking property from defendant without compensation? 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs sought an injunction and relief in damages on theories of breach of 
contract and nuisance in connection with the erection by defendants of two eight foot 
high partitions erected upon defendants1 property which arguably interfered with 
plaintiff's light, air and view. The action was originally filed in July, 1976 in connection 
with the erection by defendants of a cinder block wall dividing the adjacent properties of 
plaintiffs and defendants on Euclid Avenue. In their original Complaint, plaintiffs sought 
and obtained a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction based upon their 
claims that the proposed wall would encroach upon their property, not leave proper and 
sufficient support for the soil of plaintiffs' land and residence and would interfere with 
plaintiffs' claimed right to light, air and view from the windows on the west side of their 
residence. (Record, pages 2 through 5, Complaint). 
The original Complaint was resolved by a stipulation drafted by defendants' 
counsel and executed by the parties and their counsel, dated July 18, 1977. (Record, 
pages 124 through 128; Appendix A). The Stipulation resolved the boundary dispute 
between the parties and provided that defendants could erect the cinder block wall 
subject to certain restrictions as to its location and height. The action was to have been 
dismissed but appropriate papers were not filed to accomplish a dismissal. 
The action was renewed by the filing of another Complaint by plaintiffs in the 
Fifth Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, on or about 
November 24, 1981. (Record, pages 114 through 117). That Complaint was amended in 
the Circuit Court to allege the claims which were ultimately tried in this action. 
(Record, pages 96 through 100). The Circuit Court, Judge Larry R. Keller, ordered the 
Circuit Court action transferred to the District Court after it was determined that the 
plaintiffs were attempting to enforce the Settlement Stipulation entered into in the prior 
District Court action. The Circuit Court file was transferred to the District Court and 
the matter proceeded to trial premised upon the pleadings filed in the Circuit Court, 
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particularly the Amended Complaint referenced above. 
Plaintiffs originally sought relief against defendants grounded in claims of breach 
of contract, infliction of severe emotional distress, defamation and nuisance. On the day 
of trial, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims for infliction of severe emotional 
distress and defamation. The matter proceeded to trial before the court and a jury on 
the issues of injunctive relief and damages for breach of contract and nuisance. 
At trial, plaintiffs contended that the erection by defendants of eight foot 
partitions in the side yard between the residences of the two parties violated the terms 
of the Settlement Stipulation, justifying an award of compensatory damages and punitive 
damages. Plaintiffs additionally contended that the partitions erected by defendants 
constituted a nuisance, depriving them of their light, air and view. Defendants 
attempted to establish that the partitions were erected as a defensive measure to 
protect their privacy from unwarranted and repeated invasions thereof by the plaintiffs. 
Defendants resisted plaintiffs1 claims, maintaining that the Settlement Stipulation 
granted no express right to light, air or view and that such a right could not be implied 
under the law. 
The matter was tried commencing November 3, 1983, and continuing on November 
7, 1983. At the conclusion of the evidence and instructions and after argument, the jury 
rendered its verdict in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, awarding no damages 
for breach of contract but punitive damages for breach t>f contract in the amount of 
$1,000.00. The jury additionally awarded $1,000.00 compensatory damages on the theory 
of nuisance and $5,000.00 punitive damages for maintenance of a nuisance. The court 
remitted the jury verdict with respect to punitive damages premised upon a contract 
theory where no actual damages were found. (Record, pages 221 through 222; 571, 
Appendix B). 
The court additionally issued an injunction requiring the removal of the existing 
partitions between the residences other than the cinder block wall and further restraining 
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construction or erection between the residences of the parties of similar barriers to 
light, view and air in excess of the height of the cinder block wall. (Record, pp 249-250, 
Appendix C.) 
The court entered its judgment on verdict and injunction on July 3, 1984. (Record, 
pages 249 through 252). Defendants subsequently brought a motion for a new trial filed 
July 13, 1984. The court denied plaintiffs motion for a new trial through its Order dated 
August 28, 1984 (Record, pages 312.) Defendants filed the instant appeal on OP about 
September 19, 1984. (Record, pages 315-316, Appendix D). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs and defendants are neighbors owning adjoining parcels of property on 
which their residences are constructed. Both properties front on Euclid Avenue in Salt 
Lake City. Euclid Avenue runs east and west. The property of the parties lies to the 
south side of Euclid Avenue and defendants1 property lies to the west of that of the 
plaintiffs. The residences of the parties were constructed in close proximity such that 
plaintiffs1 residence sits approximately two feet from their westerly border, the easterly 
border of defendants7 property. (Record, pp 350-351, pp 427-429). The defendants7 house 
is situated somewhat further from the common boundary, or approximately four to five 
feet from the common boundary at the closest point and farther away at other points. 
(Record, p. 398, defendants' exhibit 34D and plaintiffs7 exhibit 58P). 
The properties of the parties are situated in an area zoned "M-lTt or light 
industrial (Record, p. 435). M-1 districts have no front yard, sideyard or rear yard 
regulations such that improvements may be built right to the property line to the height 
of 80 feet. (Zoning ordinances of Salt Lake City Sections 51-25-3 and 51-25-4). It was 
stipulated at the trial that the partitions erected by defendants which were the subject 
of the action did not violate zoning ordinances and were built pursuant to and in 
compliance with applicable zoning. (Record, page 436). 
At or about the time the original Complaint in this action was filed in July, 1976, 
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defendants commenced construction of a cinder block wall separating the adjoining 
properties of plaintiffs and defendants* Plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining 
order, enjoining further construction of the cinder block wall at a time when excavation 
and laying the footings for the wall was under way. The restraining order which was 
obtained upon sworn allegations that the wall was to encroach upon the property of the 
plaintiffs, held up construction of the cinder block wall for approximately one year* 
During that time, the building materials for the cinder block wall remained in the back 
yard of defendants and defendants were unable to proceed with construction of the 
wall. (Record, page 449-451). Plaintiffs and defendants attempted to resolve the 
controversy between them by entering into the Stipulation dated July 18, 1977, which is 
attached hereto as Appendix A. (Record, pages 124-128). In the Stipulation, the parties 
provided that the cinder block wall could be build at the location at which the footings 
had been laid. Both parties were to permit the wall to b^ constructed pursuant to the 
provisions of paragraph 4 of the Stipulation. The parties agreed to work in a cooperative 
and reasonable manner to perform the obligations of the Settlement Stipulation. 
(Paragraph 14). The cinder block wall was constructed pursuant to the specifications 
contained in the Stipulation, some time in the spring of 1978. (Record, page 381; pages 
497-498). The partitions complained of by plaintiffs at trial were installed approximately 
one year before the trial or in 1982. (Record, page 366). Defendants contend that they 
found it necessary to install the additional partitions to protect their privacy from 
invasions of the same by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contended that defendants erected the 
additional partitions solely for spite. 
The terms of the Settlement Stipulation entered into between the parties in July, 
1977, govern the construction of a cinder block wall on the property line dividing the 
property of the parties. In paragraph 4, the Stipulation provides that the cinder block 
I 
wall must be constructed in accordance with the dimensions set forth therein. The wall 
was to be constructed of standard size and quality cinder tylock by a licensed contractor 
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in accord with standard building specifications including proper footings and 
reinforcement bars. The wall was to be inspected by city building inspectors after 
issuance of necessary building permits. There was no evidence at trial to indicate that 
the cinder block wall was constructed other than in accordance with the July, 1977, 
Stipulation. The plaintiffs stipulated that the wall was properly inspected and was built 
in accordance with applicable zoning requirements. (Record, page 435; Appendix A, 
paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9). 
In their Complaint filed in Circuit Court, plaintiffs raised claims against 
defendants for breach of the Settlement Stipulation because of the erection of two 
partitions, including an eight-foot green fiberglass partition maintained on posts 
approximately four inches from and parallel to the cinder block wall, and an eight foot 
redwood partition erected on a diagonal across the front of defendants' property 
approximately three feet six inches from the wall at its nearest point near the frontage 
of the properties on Euclid Avenue, and approximately eight feet five inches from the 
cinder block wall at its farthest point from the same. Plaintiffs also raised claims for 
infliction of severe emotional distress and defamation. These claims were dismissed on 
the motion of plaintiffs on the day the trial commenced. Plaintiffs additionally sought 
relief from the partitions erected by defendants grounded on a theory of nuisance, 
claiming that the partitions were a "spite fence". (Record, page 96-100). The matter 
was tried to a jury before the Honorable Peter F. Leary on the 3rd and 7th days of 
November, 1983. The jury rendered its verdict in favor of plaintiffs and against 
defendants pursuant to the special verdict submitted by the court. (Record, pages 221-
222, Appendix B). The jury found that the defendants had breached their Settlement 
Stipulation with defendants but awarded no actual damages in connection with any such 
breach. The jury awarded $1,000.00 punitive damages with respect to breach of the 
Settlement Stipulation. The jury also found that the partitions erected by defendants 
constituted a nuisance and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000.00 
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and punitive damages on the theory of nuisance in the amount of $5,000,00. The court 
refused to permit the entry of judgment for punitive damages on the contract theory in 
the absence of a finding of actual damages, (Record, page 571), In a subsequent hearing 
held on December 21, 1983, the court indicated it would enter an injunction consistent 
with the prayer in the Complaint. Thereafter followed some confusion with respect to 
filing appropriate orders to implement the judgment and injunction and objections were 
interposed by defendants to the form of the proposed orders. The court's Injunction and 
Judgment on Verdict were finally entered on or about July 3, 1984. (Record, pages 249-
252, Appendices C and D). The injunction ultimately required removal of the partitions 
including the green fiberglass partition and the eight foot redweod partition erected in 
defendants' yard. It further enjoined defendants from constructing, erecting or placing 
between the residences of the parties similar barriers to light, view and air in excess of 
the height of the existing wall between the residences. The reference was to the existing 
cinder block wall between the residences. (Record, pages 249-250, Appendix C). In the 
Amended Complaint, plaintiffs had sought an order requiring removal of the fences to 
comply with City ordinances. (Record, pages 99-100). 
Defendants filed a Motion for New Trial and sought leave to file a Memorandum in 
excess of the five page limitation imposed by the Local Rules of the Third District 
Court. The court denied defendants' Motion to file a Memorandum in excess of the page 
limitation but did, at the time of hearing, indicate that defendants could file a shorter 
Memorandum. Defendants filed such a Memorandum but the trial court denied 
defendants1 Motion for a New Trial. This appeal was then taken by defendants-
appellants. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
U The court refused, over defendants' exception, to instruct the jury that at 
common law, no implied right to light, air or view exists. Defendants contend that 
American law refuses to recognize an implied right to light, air or view in the absence of 
some express agreement or easement for the same* Defendants contend that the court's 
failure to inform the jury of the lack of the existence of an implied right to light, air or 
view prejudiced them because it enabled the jury to infer such a right in plaintiffs. Had 
the jury been properly instructed, the result would have been different on both contract 
and nuisance theories. The Utah legislature has established requirements for solar 
easements which are not unlike rights for light, air and view. The statutory requirements 
expressly require a written instrument which describes the benefited and burdened 
property and describes the nature of the easement. The courtfs failure to instruct 
regarding implied rights to light, air and view was clear and prejudicial error and 
warrants the award to defendants of a new trial. 
2. The court's instructions on nuisance, considering the spite fence doctrine, 
were confusing and misleading and prejudicial to defendants. The court gave a general 
instruction on nuisance but failed to also instruct the jury that generally property owners 
are free to use their property as they see fit, so long as their use does not injure others. 
A fence otherwise on a party's property cannot be a nuisance merely because it 
interferes with the light, air or view of an adjoining property owner. Such an 
interpretation would violate the common law rule that rights to light, air and view do not 
exist by implication. To create a duty to preserve the light, air and view of a neighbor, 
the breach of which is actionable nuisance, defeats and undermines the policy prohibiting 
implied rights to light, air and view. Modern courts have recognized that under some 
circumstances, fences can constitute a nuisance, but have required that a showing be 
made by clear and convincing evidence that the fence or improvement which otherwise 
obstructs light, air or view was erected and maintained solely for spite only then can an 
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award of damages for its maintenance or an order to compel its removal be made. The 
courtfs instructions were ambiguous and permitted the jury to believe, especially in the 
absence of an instruction regarding light, air and view, that the mere maintenance of a 
fence which was objectionable to plaintiffs and interfered with their light, air and view 
was a nuisance. The courtTs instructions were thus improper and prejudiced defendants. 
3. In granting an«> injunction and finding that defendants breached the 
Settlement Stipulation, the court effectively implied a light, air and view easement 
burdening defendants1 property. The Settlement Stipulation discusses the erection of a 
cinder block wall and does not indicate that the defendants are otherwise limited or 
restricted in the use of their property. A right to light, air or view respecting 
improvements other than the cinder block wall can only be implied or inferred into the 
Settlement Stipulation. The Settlement Stipulation was drafted by plaintiffs1 counsel and 
under established doctrines of contractual interpretation, must be construed against the 
plaintiffs. The court, by implying a right to light, air or view and declaring a breach of 
the Settlement Stipulation by erection of partitions in excess of the height of the cinder 
block wall violated the law on implied rights to light, air and view and prejudiced the 
defendants. 
4. The court excluded admissible and relevant evidence necessary for 
defendants to establish their defense to plaintiffs' claims of breach of contract and 
maintenance of a nuisance under the spite fence doctrine. The court refused to permit 
evidence of the reputation of the plaintiffs in the community for snoopiness and invasion 
of privacy, despite the fact that plaintiffs raised the issue of their reputation in the 
community for such traits in their case in chief. Such evidence was clearly relevant and 
admissible going to the credibility of the plaintiffs and going to establish an affirmative 
defense by defendants that the improvements complained of were constructed for 
protection of their privacy as opposed to soley for spite. Defendants were prejudiced by 
this error. 
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The court excluded evidence with respect to the plaintiffs1 attempts to undermine 
the cinder block wall, which was the subject of the prior Settlement Stipulation of the 
parties. A prior breach by plaintiffs could justify defendants' nonperformance, even if it 
were established that defendants breached the Settlement Stipulation. The court's 
failure to admit testimony with respect to plaintiffs' efforts to undermine the wall was 
error and prejudiced the defendants in attempting to defend the claim of breach "of 
contract. 
The court restricted evidence offered to show that the plaintiffs repeatedly called 
governmental authorities, including police and building inspectors, to the residence of the 
defendants for the purpose of harassing them and invading their privacy. The court 
offered objections on its own motion and offered grounds for sustaining objections when 
plaintiffs' counsel did not offer them. The conduct of the court in disallowing this 
relevant evidence severely prejudiced defendants' ability to maintain a defense to 
plaintiff's claims. 
5. The injunctive relief awarded by the court is overbroad in that it restricts 
defendants' right to use their entire side yard, without compensation. The court's 
injunction violates due process of law in that it extends the provisions of the Settlement 
agreement far beyond the terms of the instrument. On a theory grounded in nuisance, 
the injunction improperly restricts defendants' ability to erect improvements in their side 
yard, regardless of defendants' motive, unless the improvements do not exceed the height 
of the existing cinder block wall. The injunction constitutes state action which deprives 
defendants of the full use of their property. The injunction restricts uses otherwise 
permitted by local zoning ordinances and building codes without any compensation to 
defendants. As such, the injunction violates due process of law and should be dissolved. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT NO IMPLIED RIGHT 
TO LIGHT, AIR OR VIEW EXISTS WAS FATALLY PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS' 
DEFENSE. 
At common law, a land owner has no easement over adjoining lands for light, air 
or view and he cannot recover damages from an adjoining land owner who constructs a 
structure, otherwise legal, which interferes with light, air or view. Taliaferro v. Salyer, 
162 Cal. App. 2d 685, 328 P.2d 799 (Cal. App. 1958). As was discussed in the case of 
Fountainbleau H. Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Florida 1957): 
No American decision has been cited, and independent research 
has revealed none, in which it has been held that - in the 
absence of some contractual or statutory obligation - a 
landowner has a legal right to the freeflow of light and air 
across the adjoining land of his neighbor. Even at common law, 
the landowner had no legal right, in the absence of an 
easement or uninterrupted use and enjoyment for a period of 
twenty (20) years, to unobstructed light and air from adjoining 
land . . . and the English doctrine of "ancient lights" has been 
unanimously repudiated in this country. Id. at 359. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada, reversing a trial court decision recognizing a right 
to light and air, gave the rationale for the majority rule: 
To imply the grant of such a right (to light and air) without 
express words, would greatly embarass the improvement of 
estates, and, by reason of the very indefinite character of the 
right asserted, promote litigation. The simplest rule, and that 
best suited to a country like ours, in which changes are taking 
place in the ownership and use of lands, is that no right of this 
character can be acquired without express grant of an interest 
in, or covenant relating to, the lands over which the right is 
claimed. Boyd v. McDonald, 408 P.2d 717, 722 (Nevada 1965). 
Unless a property owner can prove that he has an easement for light, air or view 
in or over adjoining property, he generally has no cause of action or cause for complaint 
if the light, air or view are interfered with or entirely shut off by erection of a structure 
otherwise lawful on adjoining property. City of McAlester v. King, 317 P.2d 265 
(Oklahoma 1957). Additionally, whether or not the structure is appealing to the property 
- 1 1 -
owner who objects to it, the property owner has no right to damages from the adjoining 
landowner. Id. at page 273. See also Boyd v. McDonald, 408 P.2d 717 (Nevada 1965). 
Whether or not an implied right to light, air or view exists in Utah appears to be a 
matter of first impression. No direct statutory authority governing light, air or view 
easements in Utah has been found. However, the Utah legislature has spoken with regard 
to requirements for creation of solar easements. Solar easements are similar to 
easements for light and air, but differ in that they are specifically directed toward 
maintenance of clear land or solar sky space for the purpose of insuring adequate 
exposure of a solar energy system as defined in the statute. Section 57-13-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, governs the creation of solar easements and provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
(1) Any property owner may grant a solar easement in the 
same manner and with the same effect as a conveyance of an 
interest in real property. The easements shall be created in 
writing and shall be filed, duly recorded and indexed in the 
office of the recorder of the county in which the easement is 
granted. Such easements shall run with the land or lands 
benefited and burdened and shall constitute a perpetual 
easement, except that a solar easement may terminate upon 
the conditions stated herein. 
The statute provides that the instrument which creates a solar easement must include a 
description of the real property subject to the solar easement and a description of the 
real property benefiting from the easement. The vertical and horizontal angles 
expressed in degrees and measured from the sight of the solar energy system must be 
described. In the statute creating the right to a solar easement in Utah, the Utah 
legislature requires performance of specified conditions before the creation of such an 
interest. In the absence of such conditions such an easement does not exist. 
The requirement of meeting such formalities for creation of such an easement is 
logical considering the substantial interference with property rights such an easement 
creates. Like a solar easement, an easement for light, view or air deprives a property 
owner of the right to put his property to otherwise legitimate uses of his choice, 
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conceivably without any compensation for such limitations. The requirements of the 
Utah statute should provide guidance to this court with respect to the policy of the Utah 
legislature, which has apparently adopted the majority rule which denies the existence of 
such easements for light, air or view unless they are specifically reserved by grant or 
reservation in a deed or other recorded instrument. 
The court failed, over defendant's exception (Record, page 556), to instruct the 
jury with respect to the law on implied easements for light, air or view. In the absence 
of an instruction indicating that such rights do not exist in Utah, the jury could well have 
believed and probably did believe that the Behunins had an implied right to light, air and 
view. Interference with light, air and view was the main damage claimed by the 
Behunins and, pursuant to the testimony of the plaintiffs, was their main concern in 
bringing the action. It was the reason the plaintiffs sought an Order compelling removal 
of defendants1 partitions. The importance was not lost upon the trial court as the 
injunction specifically restricts defendants from interfering with the light, view and air 
of the plaintiffs between the residences of the parties. (Record, page 250, Appendix C). 
In arguing for the issuance of an injunction, Mr. Alder requested that the court issue an 
Order that there be no obstruction to light, view and air. (Record, page 571). 
In the absence of an instruction limiting implied rights to light, view and air, the 
jury was free to impose such an implied burden upon defendants* property in rendering its 
judgment, regardless of the terms of the Settlement Stipulation. It was not necessary for 
the jury to imply the easement from the stipulation when from the instructions given by 
the court, there was no indication that such a right did not exist independently. 
Defendants were severely prejudiced by virtue of the court's failure to give an 
instruction limiting the jury's right to imply a right in plaintiffs to light, view and air. In 
finding a breach of the Settlement Stipulation, the court and the jury must have implied 
a right in plaintiffs to light, view and air, as there is no express grant of such a right in 
the Settlement Stipulation. The Stipulation expressly concerns only the height of the 
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cinder block wall. It does not in any respect restrict defendants from erecting any other 
improvements on their property, whether or not they exceed the height of the wall 
governed by the Stipulation. Only by implication can a right to light, air or view arise in 
plaintiffs pursuant to the Stipulation, and the law in virtually every jurisdiction condemns 
creation of such a right by implication. The courtTs failure to instruct the jury was so 
prejudicial to defendants that a new trial is warranted in this case. 
POINT H. 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON NUISANCE AND THE SPITE FENCE 
DOCTRINE WERE CONFUSING AND MISLEADING AND WERE PREJUDICIAL TO 
DEFENDANTS1 DEFENSE. 
In Schulz v. Quintana, 576 P.2d 855 (Utah 1978), it was observed that a landowner 
may generally take any action with regard to his own property which he desires, so long 
as it does not harm others. In the instant case it was claimed that the partitions 
maintained by defendants were a nuisance. The court instructed the jury that "anything 
which is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to 
the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or 
property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action." (Jury Instruction No. 15, Record 
page 201). The court also instructed that "No one may make an unreasonable use of his 
own property to the material injury of his neighbors. The determination is whether the 
act or use is a reasonable exercise of the dominion which the property owner has by 
virtue of his ownership over his property having regard for all interests affected; his own 
and those of his neighbors and public policy." (Jury Instruction No. 16, Record page 
202). These definitions of nuisance are better suited to traditional nuisance claims 
where, for example, a noxious odor or substance travels from the property of the 
defendant to the property of the plaintiff. In the case before the court, the claimed 
damage was that the partitions which constituted the "nuisance" deprived the plaintiffs 
of light, air and view. That interference with light, air or view by the maintenance of a 
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partition wholely upon the property of the defendant could constitute a nuisance is 
inconsistent with the law on implied light, air or view easements. If a party can compel 
removal of partitions upon a theory of nuisance under the general definitions embodied in 
the court's instructions, cited above, there would be no meaning to the doctrine that no 
implied right to light, air or view exists. Any party could enforce such an easement by 
claiming that the objectionable improvement constituted a nuisance. 
Most early cases and some current decisions hold that a man can build a fence or 
structure upon his own land as high as he pleases, though he erects it solely out of spite 
and for the purpose of annoying his neighbor. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 17 
S.Ct, 864, see annotation, 133 A.L.R, 697. These courts preclude the maintenance of any 
action to recover damages on account of erection of a fence or structure wholely upon 
the property of the defendant. Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, 
have recognized an exception to the common law rule with respect to fences or 
partitions which are erected solely for spite. Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners Assoc, 
656 P.2d 414 (Utah 1982). The rule was discussed in Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491, 13 
S.E. 2d 20 (Georgia 1941). It was followed in the Idaho case of Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 
96 Idaho 367, 509 P.2d 785 (Idaho 1973). The Idaho Sundowner case was cited by the Utah 
court in Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners Assoc, cited above. The modern rule thus 
recognized is that a fence or other improvement can constitute a nuisance where it is 
erected solely for spite. However, where the structure serves some useful purpose to its 
owner it cannot be the subject of an award for damages n0r can an injunction compel its 
removal. Plaintiff proceeded upon the theory that the green fiberglass partition and the 
redwood partition at the front of the property were spite fences, erected solely for spite. 
Defendant took exception at trial to the instruction of the court, particularly with 
regard to the courtfs attempt to instruct the jury on the subject of nuisance in connection 
with the maintenance of fences. (Record p. 555-556, Appendix I). In Jury Instruction No. 
18 the court instructed Tta fence is not lawful if it serves some useful purpose, however 
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slight, when the underlying intent and result are to cause injury to the property of 
another." (Record p. 204). This is not consistent with the law that the motive must be 
solely spite. While the court did provide an instruction indicating that a spite fence must 
be maintained solely for the purpose of annoying his neighbor (Instruction 21, Record p. 
207) the court refused to change the negative characterization of Instruction 18 and 
further refused to modify the impact of Instruction No. 18 by giving the prof erred 
instruction based upon the case of Schulz v. Quintana, 576 P.2d 855 (Utah 1978) to the 
effect that generaly, landowners may use their property as they see fit so long as they 
observe due regard for the safety and rights of others. The cumulative effect of the 
court's inconsistent instructions was to cause confusion among the members of the jury 
with respect to the rule on spite fences. 
As there is no implied right to light, air or view, a fence cannot be a nuisance 
merely because it interferes with the enjoyment of adjoining property by interfering with 
light, air or view. The court's general instructions with regard to nuisance coupled with 
he court's failure to instruct on implied rights to light, air and view provide the basis for 
this confusion. The court's refusal to provide an instruction that generally property 
owners are free to use their property as they see fit combined with an instruction 
indicating that there is no implied right to light, air or view was necessary in order to 
give the jury a proper understanding of the law on spite fences. The fence cannot be a 
nuisance merely because it annoyed the plaintiffs or interfered with their light, air or 
view unless the jury found that the fence was maintained solely for a spiteful purpose and 
served no other useful and legitimate purpose for the defendants. Rowley v. Marrcrest 
Homeowner's Assoc, 656 P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1982). 
One court has indicated that a restriction of a property owner's rights regarding 
his property in the presence of any motive other than malice arises to a constitutional 
deprivation of property without due process of law. Baillargeon v. Press, 11 Wash. App. 
59, 529 P.2d 746 (Wash. App. 1974). The court's failure to instruct with respect to a 
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property ownerTs right to use his property as he sees fit so long as he is not motivated 
solely by spite, and the failure to instruct that implied easements to light, air and view 
are not available caused the jury to misconstrue the requirements for nuisance under the 
spite fence doctrine and severely prejudiced the defendants, entitling them to a new 
trial. 
POINT HI. 
THE COURT EFFECTIVELY IMPLIED A RIGHT TO LIGHT, AIR AND VIEW IN 
PLAINTIFFS, IN DEROGATION OF THE COMMON LAW, IN FINDING THE 
DEFENDANTS BREACHED THE SETTLEMENT STIPULATION, 
As indicated above, it is nearly the universal American rule that no implied right 
to light, air or view exists. The property in the instant action was zoned M-l, light 
industrial. There are no sideyard requirements in a light industrial zoning area and 
improvements may be erected on the property to a height of eighty feet. The eight foot 
partitions erected by plaintiffs were well within the requirements of zoning as was 
stipulated at the time of trial. (Record, pages 435-436). See also Salt Lake City Zoning 
Ordinances, Section 51-25-3 and 51-25-4. The Settlement Stipulation executed to resolve 
the original complaint (Record, pages 124-128, Appendix A), provides in paragraph 4 as 
follows: 
4. It is agreeable to the Plaintiffs that the Defendants be 
allowed to construct a cinder block wall in accord with the 
dimensions hereinafter set out along the Western boundary of 
Plaintiffs1 property (the Eastern boundary of Defendants1 
property). This wall is to be placed upon the foundation which 
was constructed by Defendants prior to he institution of this 
action against Defendants. The wall will b0 constructed of 
standard size and quality cinder block. It shall commence on 
the Northwest corner of Plaintiffsr property and thence run in 
a southerly direction along the Western boundary line of 
Plaintiffs' property (the Eastern boundary line of Defendants' 
property) and shall be of a height not to exceed four feet 
including proper capping material. It shall continue at a height 
not exceeding four feet to the Northwest corner of Plaintiffs' 
residence. At the Northwest corner of Plaintiffs' residence, 
the wall shall be increased to a height not to exceed five feet 
including proper capping material, and shall continue at a 
height not exceeding five feet until it reaches the Southwest 
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corner of Plaintiffs1 residence. At the Southwest corner of 
Plaintiffs1 residence, the wall shall be increased to a height not 
exceeding seven feet including proper capping material and 
shall continue at a height not exceeding seven feet to its 
termination point at the Southwest corner of Plaintiffs1 
property (the Southeast corner of Defendants7 property). 
This paragraph was relied upon by plaintiffs and the court in determining that defendants 
had breached the Settlement Stipulation by erecting the eight foot partitions, including 
the green fiberglass partition and the redwood partition at the front of defendants' 
property. Nowhere in the Stipulation is there any restriction upon defendants with 
respect to improvements other than the cinder block wall. Nowhere in the Stipulation is 
there a grant of any right to light, air or view. The only restriction provides that the 
height of the cinder block wall is limited to the dimensions contained in the Stipulation. 
Testimony adduced at trial established that the Settlement Stipulation was 
drafted by plaintiffs' counsel. (Testimony of Ardella Behunin, Record page 354). As a 
matter of law, agreements are construed against the parties who draft them and any 
ambiguities in the document are resolved in favor of the party that did not draft them. 
Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 U.2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1972). Thus, if the Stipulation 
is ambiguous or fails to address a point, the ambiguity thereby created must be resolved 
in favor of defendants as a matter of law. 
The Complaint filed by plaintiffs, which the Stipulation was designed to settle, 
made a variety of allegations as to why the cinder block wall should not be constructed 
and its construction enjoined. While the plaintiffs did complain of the loss of their light, 
air and view in the first count, the plaintiffs also claimed that the wall was being 
instructed on or about their property and that the construction of the wall was 
wrongfully and negligently adjacent to plaintiffs' land without leaving proper and 
sufficient support for the soil of plaintiffs' land and the buildings. The Complaint 
additionally sounded in trespass. (Record, pages 2-5). The Affidavit of Ardella Behunin 
filed in support of the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order similarly concerns 
itself with encroachment, trespass and undermining plaintiffs' foundation as well as 
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interference with plaintiffs1 light, air and view, (Record, pages 6-7). 
In their testimony with respect to the reasons for entering into the Stipulation, 
the defendants indicated that they were concerned with the costs of the litigation and 
were further concerned that the building materials for the project had been stored on 
their property for approximately one year. Defendants wished to remedy their torn up 
yard, to build the wall and be finished with the hassle of the lawsuit. (Record, page 
452). Nowhere did defendants testify that they intended to grant a light, air or view 
easement or otherwise make any concession to plaintiffs except with regard to the cinder 
block wall. 
In its findings, the court found that the placement of the barriers or partitions 
between the residences of the parties, above the height of the existing wall and in front 
of plaintiffs' windows, was a breach of the prior Stipulation of the parties. (Record, page 
250). The court could only find that the erection of the subsequent partitions constituted 
a breach of the Stipulation if it implied into the Stipulation a right to light, air and 
view. Such inference or implication is error as a matter of law, given the provisions of 
the contract under circumstances where ambiguities must be resolved in favor of 
defendants. The Settlement Stipulation does not meet the requirements of the solar 
easement statute found at Section 57-13-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in 
that it does not describe the benefited or burdened properties, does not describe the 
angles or degrees or times during which light must be made available. It is conceded that 
the solar easement statute was enacted after the execution of the Stipulation. Still, the 
statute is illustrative of the requirements to establish &n express light, air or view 
easement. Those requirements were clearly not met in the Settlement Stipulation. The 
court's finding is against the law and is error and should be reversed. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE NECESSARY 
FOR DEFENDANTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR DEFENSE IN THIS MATTER, THEREBY 
COMMITTING CLEAR AND REVERSABLE ERROR. 
Defendants attempted to defend this matter by demonstrating to the court and 
the jury that their actions in erecting the fiberglass partition and the redwood partition 
at the front of the property were but reactions to repeated invasions of their privacy by 
the plaintiffs. The defendants additionally attempted to demonstrate that the plaintiffs 
themselves breached the Settlement Stipulation by failing to comply with paragraph 14 
thereof by undertaking various acts to undermine the cinder block wall. Defendants 
argued that the prior breach by plaintiffs acted to relieve defendants of the obligation to 
abide by the Stipulation to the extent, if any, it granted to plaintiffs the implied right to 
light, air and view which the jury and court inferred. (Record, pages 231 and 232). In 
addition to improperly sustaining repeated objections grounded on relevance respecting 
areas of inquiry going to the motive of defendants for erecting the partitions and going 
to the credibility of the plaintiffs and their witnesses, the court additionally assisted 
plaintiffs by offering grounds for objection in one instance and in objecting on its own 
motion to relevance on other occasions, (e.g., Record, page 402, lines 9 through 23 and 
pages 437-438). The court erred with respect to evidentiary rulings in the following 
respects: 
(a) Defendants attempted to establish that the plaintiffs repeatedly 
harassed them and invaded their privacy by calling various governmental authorities 
including the police, the health department and the building inspector to their property 
to investigate complaints made by plaintiffs on repeated and numerous occasions. On 
direct testimony, plaintiff Ardella Behunin testified that she had called the police to the 
Gallegos1 residence. (Record, page 377, lines 11 through 15). That Mrs. Behunin had 
repeatedly called the police to investigate defendants' property provided justification for 
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defendants1 erection of privacy partitions to prevent her from prying into their business 
and further harassing them. Testimony established on direct examination at least two 
such occasions on which police were called. (Record, pages 376-377 and pages 420-421). 
However, in cross-examination of plaintiff Ardella Behunin, the court refused to permit 
any inquiry into occasions when Mrs. Behunin called the Salt Lake City Police to the 
Gallegos residence. On page 402 of the record, Ardella Behunin testified that she called 
the police to the Gallegos residence on quite a few occasions. (Record, page 402, lines 9-
11). The court, without any objection from counsel, inquired as to the relevancy of the 
testimony. The testimony was proferred to show the reason why defendants desired 
privacy. The court offered grounds for the objection to assist plaintiffs' counsel, 
indicating that the court deemed the examination outside the scope of direct. The court 
then sustained the objection when counsel mimicked the court's grounds. (Record, page 
402, Appendix J). This ruling was entirely improper. Plaintiff had raised the issue of 
calling police officers to the defendants1 residence on direct examination. Additionally, 
the defendants' allegations that the police were repeatedly and unnecessarily called to 
their residence, justifying their need for increased privacy, was a critical point in 
defendants' defense. Defendants were entitled to have Mrs. Behunin testify with respect 
to the numerous occasions on which she called the police to defendants' residence as the 
testimony would have demonstrated the plaintiffs' inability to mind her own business and 
refrain from invading the privacy of defendants. Testimony in this area was necessary 
for defendants to establish that their motive for erection of the partitions complained of 
was not malice for the plaintiffs but protection of their privacy from the harassment of 
the plaintiffs, as they claimed. The refusal to permit inquiry into this area was clear and 
prejudicial error. 
(b) The court, on two occasions, refused to permit neighbors of the Behunins 
to testify with respect to the Behunins' reputation in the community for snoopiness and 
for invasion of the privacy of others. Defendants called Angelina Heuser, who had 
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formerly resided in defendants' house and, after moving from the same, had resided in 
the same neighborhood, approximately one block away for the last ten years. (Record, 
page 335-336, pages 519-521). Plaintiffs objected to the testimony regarding reputation 
on grounds of relevancy and the court sustained the objection and would not permit 
introduction of Mrs. HeuserTs opinion of the reputation of the Behunins in the 
neighborhood. Edwin Christensen was additionally prevented from testifying with 
respect to his opinion of the reputation of the Behunins in the neighborhood. Mr. Snow 
and Mr. Christensen lived across the street from the plaintiffs for approximately ten 
years. (Record, page 522). Mr. Snow testified that he had occasion to speak to the 
Behunins and to observe their conduct in relation to the defendants. When asked whether 
he had an opinion about the reputation of Mr. and Mrs. Behunin as neighbors the court 
sustained counsel's objection which presumably was grounded in relevancy. (Record, page 
532). 
The reputation of the Behunins in the neighborhood as snoopy individuals was a 
crucial element of defendants' defense. The courts' refusal to permit defendants to 
introduce testimony of these neighbors with respect to the reputation of the Behunins 
was error because plaintiffs raised the issue of their reputation in the community 
regarding snoopiness on direct examination. On page 384 of the record, counsel asks Mrs. 
Behunin: 
Q. Fm going to ask you, have you ever had any problems with 
any of the other neighbors in your neighborhood? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Do you consider yourself a good neighbor? 
A. I sure do. I try to be a good neighbor. 
Q. Has anybody accused you of being a snoop? 
A. No, not that I know of. 
Additionally, prior to any attempt by defendants to introduce testimony regarding 
the reputation of the plaintiffs for snoopiness, plaintiffs, on direct examination produced 
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a character witness to support their contention that the plaintiffs were not snoopy and 
were well liked in the neighborhood. At page 439 of the record, Hetti Vandongen was 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiffs. In direct examination Mr. Alder asked: 
Q. Just like to ask you a few brief questions about your 
relationship with the Behunins and whether you are aware of 
any rumors or complaints about them. Let me be specific — 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever had occasion to have other neighbors 
complain to you about the Behunins? 
A. No. Never. 
Q. Have you ever had any complaints about the Behunins as 
neighbors? 
A. No. 
Q. Have they ever threatened you? 
A. Ardella? 
Q. Yes. 
A. And Joe? 
Q. Yes. 
A. There was a big help after my husband being sick and 
died. They had the car and done other little things and they're 
always there to help. They're wonderful. They be wonderful. 
Q. They give you a ride? 
A. Whenever I need it. 
Q. Do you think that they're interfering with the Gall egos? 
A. I don't know how. 
Q. Have you ever observed them spying on the Gallegos? 
A. No, not that I know of. 
Q. Do you think that they would? 
A. Ardella and Joe? 
Q. Yes. 
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A. They have been wonderful. 
The testimony with regard to opinion proferred by defendants from Mrs. Heuser and Mr. 
Snow was admissible to rebut the direct testimony of Ardella Behunin and Hetti 
Vandongen. The contrary opinions of two other neighbors who had resided in the 
neighborhood was relevant to challenge the credibility of Ardella Behunin and Hetti Van 
Dongen and to additionally support defendants' contentions that the Behunins were 
excessively snoopy individuals, concerned with the business of others, with the effect of 
invading the privacy of the defendants. Defendants' entire claim in this litigation has 
been that it is the conduct of the plaintiffs in this action which motivated and justified 
the erection of the partitions. They erected these partitions to protect their privacy 
from the prying eyes of the Behunins. This testimony was relevant to show defendants' 
defense premised upon the spite fence doctrine which requires that the sole motive for 
the erection of the partitions be for spite and malice against the plaintiffs. If defendants 
could have shown that the partitions served a useful purpose to them by protecting their 
privacy, the court could not lawfully compel their removal and the jury could not 
properly award damages for nuisance or breach of the Settlement Stipulation. 
(c) On pages 456-457 of the record (Appendix K), an objection was raised to 
the following question directed to defendant Arlene Gallegos: "What kind of privacy 
problems, if any, did you have with the Behunins after the erection of the concrete block 
wall?" Plaintiffs' objection was grounded in relevance. Counsel indicated at page 456, 
line 21 and 22: "So, I don't see what relevance privacy problems have to the wall." The 
question is critically relevant as it is an attempt to establish the motive for erecting the 
partitions which were erected after construction of the concrete block wall. Defendants 
claimed that they erected the partitions to protect their privacy after the cinder block 
wall was constructed. The court sustained the objection. Sustaining this objection was 
clearly error as the objection could not stand based in relevancy, which was the ground 
offered by plaintiffs' counsel. The privacy problems experienced by defendants after 
- 2 4 -
erection of the concrete block wall are the very meat of the defendants' ease. The court 
repeatedly prevented defendants from introducing evidence which would demonstrate and 
justify their motive for erecting the partitions i.e. protection of their privacy. Denying 
defendants the opportunity to introduce this evidence was prejudicial error. 
(d) Defendants claimed that plaintiffs attempted to undermine and weaken 
OP destroy the wall by soaking their property adjacent to the wall with water. Testimony 
with respect to this issue was offered by Arlene Gall egos, Kay Snow and Eugene 
Haddenham. Mr. Haddenham was a contractor retained to install a patio on the 
defendants' property. He testified beginning at page 479 of the record that while 
excavating to do concrete work for the patio he observed seepage of water coming from 
the fence line. Defendants were attempting to establish that the seepage was due to the 
saturated ground on the plaintiffs1 side of the cinder block wall. Defendants alleged that 
plaintiffs repeatedly soaked the wall to attempt to undermine its foundations. This 
testimony was relevant to show the plaintiffs' own breach of the Settlement Stipulation 
upon which they relied to establish a right to light, air and view over defendants' 
property. A prior breach by plaintiffs would arguably relieve defendants from 
performance even should there be a covenant to preserve the light, air or view of the 
plaintiffs. The testimony was thus relevant and important to defendants' case. In 
addition, the testimony was relevant to the issue of the credibility of the plaintiffs who 
had denied attempts to undermine the wall by saturating their property adjacent to the 
wall with water. 
In attempting to lay the foundation for Mr. H^ddenham's testimony and in 
attempting to establish the area where the seepage was noted, the witness was asked to 
indicate on a diagram prepared by plaintiff, Exhibit 52P, the location of the 15 foot strip 
where the seepage was observed. (Record p. 480). An objection regarding relevance was 
sustained by the court without any opportunity to defend the relevance of the inquiry. 
The court additionally limited defendants1 attempts to describe plaintiffs' efforts to 
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undermine the wall by trenching on pages 467 and 468 of the record. In this testimony, in 
attempting to lay a proper foundation with respect to the size and shape of the 
excavation undertaken by plaintiffs adjacent to the wall, the court, on its own motion 
objected, arguably on grounds of relevance, and denied counsel for defendant the 
opportunity to defend the relevance of the inquiry. The court concluded that TtI know 
what you are trying to show, and I think what you are getting at right now is irrelevant 
and immaterial. It's a time waster. Let's get to the issues, not how deep the hole was. 
(Record, page 468). The court's attitude with respect to defendants' attempts to 
demonstrate that plaintiffs also breached the Settlement Stipulation by attempting to 
undermine the existing cinder block wall were error and prejudiced the defendants' 
defense in this matter, justifying a new trial. 
(e) The court prevented defendants from eliciting testimony from Mrs. 
Behunin with respect to her repeated calls to the Salt Lake Building Inspectors with 
respect to improvements erected in defendants' yard. On pages 390-391 of the record 
defendants attempted to establish that Mrs. Behunin had repeatedly called building 
inspectors to inspect the cinder block wall while it was being constructed. On page 391, 
defendants attempted to establish the date Mrs. Behunin first recalled seeing a building 
inspection paper for the wall. This testimony was relevant to demonstrate that in spite 
of her knowledge that the wall had been approved and inspected she continued to call the 
building inspectors for the purpose of harassing defendants. Counsel objected to 
defendants' attempts to establish the date that Mrs. Behunin first was aware that there 
was a building inspection document for the wall. The court sustained the objection and 
did not permit testimony in this area. It was error to prevent the defendants from 
establishing the repeated calls to the building inspector by Mrs. Behunin. Such testimony 
would have established her proclivity for invading the privacy of defendants, justifying 
the erection of the partitions to protect the defendants' privacy. 
(f) In attempting to challenge the credibility of Ardella Behunin, defendants 
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attempted to employ the allegation of paragraph 25 of the Amended Complaint which 
alleges "That the defendants further maintaining an eight foot high fence around the 
outer perimeter of their property along the street is in violation of the Salt Lake City 
ordinances." At trial, Ardella Behunin testified that the chain link fence was six feet 
tall. (Record, page 392). The question was asked "Do you know why it is alleged in the 
Complaint filed in this action that the fence is eight feet high?" Counsel objected and 
indicated that he did not think the allegations of the Complaint were relevant. The court 
sustained this objection. The matter was clearly relevant to demonstrate that the 
Complaint was filed for purposes of harassment and that its allegations were not 
credible. The allegations of the Complaint were relevant as they were the basis for the 
parties being in court. Sustaining the objection on grounds of relevancy was error. 
Defendants were reluctant to proceed in this area given the courtfs ruling on 
grounds of relevancy. There is a point in any trial when parties are hesitant to incur the 
further ire of the court in the presence of the jury by proceeding in an area that the 
court has stifled. However, it should be noted that paragraph 13 of the Answer to 
defendants' Interrogatories, (Record, p. 93) states that the factual basis of the allegation 
that the defendants maintained an eight foot fence around the outer perimeter was that 
the fence was constructed without a proper building permit. All this goes to show the 
plaintiffs' inordinate concern and medling in defendants' business with respect to 
improvements placed upon defendants' property. Ardella Behunin raised the matter of 
the chain link fence in her direct testimony. (Record, pages 379-380). After the matter 
was raised on direct examination it was clearly proper and relevant to broach the matter 
on cross-examination. 
(g) On page 482-483 of the record, in attempting to rehabilitate Arlene 
Gallegos, defendants questioned whether there was anything in the Settlement 
Stipulation granting a right to light and air in the Behunins. (Record, page 482, line 23 
and following, Appendix L). The court, without an objection from plaintiff, refused 
- 2 7 -
further inquiry into the matter and refused to permit defendantsT counsel to explain why 
the matter was proper redirect. Plaintiffs' counsel raised the intent behind the 
Settlement Stipulation in cross-examination of Arlene Gall egos at pages 471-473 of the 
record. He asked her: 
Q. Even though the agreement was that there would be only a 
certain height of that barrier you don't think putting your 
barrier higher than that violated the agreement? 
A. No, I don't because that's not touching the fence. That's on 
our property. . . . 
Q. Is there any reason that they would care about the height 
except to be able to see over? 
A. I don't know what they wanted to see over. It's right in our 
back yard. 
Q. Answer my question. 
A. I don't know what they think, but I don't — 
Q. Why would they care about the height of the wall, is my 
question to you. 
A. Because they want to see in our yard, I guess. There's 
nothing else over there. 
Q. You agreed to keep it a set height. 
A. The concrete wall is still — 
Q. Didn't you understand their concerns about height because 
of light and air? 
A. There is quite a bit of light in there. 
Q. Answer the question. 
A. 1 answered the question. The fiberglass is not on the wall. 
Q. Didn't you understand at the time the Stipulation was 
signed that their concern was with the height for the purpose 
of being able to see over it? 
A. They said several things. 
Q. Did you — 
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A. No. They did not. They said several things. (Record, pp 
472-473). 
On redirect counsel for defendant asked: 
Q. Is there anything in that document granting a right in the 
Behunins to light or air? 
A. No sir. 
The court: This is not proper redirect. You have been over 
that before on your direct examination. 
Mr. Silvestrini: Your Honor, I believe this — 
The court: I have ruled, counsel. 
Mr. Silvestrini: Your Honor, I believe — 
The court: Counsel, I have ruled on it. (Record, pages 482-483). 
Questioning Arlene Gallegos on redirect examination with respect to the intention 
of the parties in executing the Settlement Stipulation was clearly relevant and proper 
redirect examination given counsel's cross-examination questioning the motivation of the 
parties for entering into the Stipulation. Counsel attempted to have defendant testify 
that the intent was to create an implied right to light, air and view. The court's 
interference with redirect, without any objection from plaintiffs' counsel, clearly 
prejudiced defendants and hindered their ability to present their defenses. 
(h) At page 491 of the record, defendants attempted to question Ardella 
Behunin on direct examination with respect to the wall watering incidents which 
defendants contended were designed to saturate the ground under the cinder block wall 
for the purpose of undermining and weakening it. As mentioned before, such testimony 
was relevant to show both an invasion of the privacy of the defendants and a prior breach 
of the Settlement Stipulation by plaintiffs which relieved defendants of any obligation 
for performance of the agreement. At page 491, Ardella Behunin attempted to explain 
why she was watering the wall. After her explanation she was asked how long she had to 
water the wall on each such occasion. An objection was made regarding relevance and 
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the court sustained the objection. The testimony was relevant for the reasons stated 
above. The court's refusal to permit defendants to inquire into this conduct by 
defendants and other conduct which invaded the privacy of the Gallegos and 
demonstrated that the Behunins were not observing the provisions of the Settlement 
Stipulation was prejudicial to the defense of the defendants and justifies the granting of 
a new trial on this matter. 
(i) During direct testimony of defendant Mark Gallegos he was asked at page 
498 of the record what kind of conduct the Behunins demonstrated after the building of 
the cinder block wall that the defendants found objectionable. This question area was 
relevant to the inquiry before the court, as the defendants claimed it was the actions of 
the plaintiffs which required them to protect their privacy by erecting the additional 
partitions. The objections on page 498, which were sustained by the court, were made at 
a time when the subject matter was barely broached with the witness. That the court 
sustained the objection demonstrates the court's impatience with the defendants. These 
rulings prejudiced defendants before the jury and limited their right to maintain a lawful 
defense to plaintiffs' claims. 
(j) On page 527 of the record (Appendix M) defendants attempted through 
another witness to introduce testimony with respect to the plaintiffs attempts to soak 
the ground on their side of the wall for the purpose of undermining it. While no question 
was pending, counsel for plaintiff raised an objection on the general ground of relevance 
to the testimony regarding flooding the wall. The court sustained the objection and 
would not permit defendants' counsel to explain or justify the relevance of the matter. 
The court refused to permit further inquiry into the matter by sustaining a second 
objection to a pending question on page 528* Again on page 528 the court sustained an 
objection to a question with respect to whether or not the witness, Mr. Kay Snow, 
observed Mr. or Mrs. Behunin to have an interest in the comings and goings in his 
property. (Page 528, line 11 and following). The court sustained the objection denying 
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the inquiry. The inquiry was relevant going to the credibility of the plaintiff Ardella 
Behunin who had testified that she had no problems with her neighbors and was not 
snoopy and to the credibility of Hetti Van Dongen and additionally relevant to support 
the testimony of the defendants that the plaintiffs were snoopy individuals who 
repeatedly invaded the privacy of their neighbors, necessitating the erection of the 
partitions. The court's refusal to permit defendants to inquire into this matter 
prejudiced defendants' interests and denied them the opportunity to present legitimate 
defenses. 
In order to prevail against defendants on the theory of breach of contract, 
plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that the Settlement Stipulation entered into between 
the parties granted them a right of light, air and view over the defendants' property. In 
order to prevail on the theory of nuisance, under the spite fence doctrine, plaintiffs 
needed to show that defendants' sole motive for erecting the eight foot partitions was 
spite and malice directed against the plaintiffs. Defendants attempted to defend against 
plaintiffs' claim for nuisance by demonstrating that their motive was protection of their 
privacy against plaintiffs, who demonstrated an unusual disregard for the privacy of their 
neighbors, including the Gallegos. The cumulative effect of the court's evidentiary 
rulings in limiting the testimony of defendants and their witnesses with respect to the 
reputation of the plaintiffs in the neighborhood for snoopiness, denied defendants the 
opportunity to present their defense to plaintiffs' claims to the jury. The court 
demonstrated impatience with the defendants, almost as if the court had determined 
from the outset of the case that the partitions were a nuisance and the defendants were 
wasting the court's time in attempting to defend them. 
Disputes between neighbors are never pleasant. Such disputes frequently tend to 
degenerate into base name calling and mud slinging. However, such problems are rarely 
the fault of one party alone and a party attempting to defend its property rights against 
plaintiffs such as these is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing of all claims and 
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defenses of the parties. Defendants were denied such an opportunity in the trial of this 
matter. Defendants did not choose to air their dirty laundry in the forum of this court 
but were forced to do so in defense of the action filed by the plaintiffs. In addition to 
misapplying the law governing the facts of this case, the court, through its evidentiary 
rulings, denied the defendants the ability and right to present their defense and to set 
forth the basis for their claim that these partitions were properly erected to protect 
their privacy and not for spite. Under the spite fence rule, if the partitions were erected 
for a motive other than spite, even if spite is also present, the court could not compel 
their removal nor could the court award damages against defendants for maintaining 
them. The evidentiary rulings of the court, together with its failure to instruct the jury 
with regard to the lack of existence of an implied right to light, air or view, constituted 
clear and prejudicial error and deprived defendants of a fair trial, 
POINT V. 
THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AWARDED BY THE COURT VIOLATES DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW, 
The court's findings and injunction require defendants to remove the existing 
barriers and further to refrain from constructing, erecting or placing between the 
residences of the parties, similar barriers to light, view and air in excess of the height of 
the existing wall between the residences. The court's ruling, grounded in nuisance, has 
the effect of depriving defendants of their right to fully use and enjoy their property 
without any award of compensation. The courtTs injunction expressly imposes a light, air 
and view easement burdening defendants' property over their side yard. As has been 
discussed previously, such easements are not favored and cannot arise by implication. 
The courtfs injunction therefore violates the due process provisions of the Federal 
Constitution under the Fifth Amendment thereof and the Fourteenth Amendment thereto 
and additionally violates the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7, Article I, Section 
7 of the Constitution of Utah provides "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
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property, without due process of law." In interpreting Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court has held that as the provision in the Constitution 
of Utah is substantially similar to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal 
Constitution, the decisions of the federal supreme court are highly persuasive as to the 
applications of this clause of the Constitution of Utah. Untermeyer v. State Tax Comm., 
102 U.214, 129 P.2d 881. As early as 1885, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that where 
a state by its law authorizes the taking of private property without compensation, there 
is not due process of law. Kentucky Railroad Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 6 S.Ct. 57 (U.S. 
1885). The Georgia Supreme Court has held that requiring removal of outdoor signs on 
private property adjoining interstate highways was unconstitutional as controlling and 
limiting the use of private property without just compensation. State Highway 
Department v. Branch, 22 Ga. 770, 152 S.E. 2d 372 (Ga. 1966). The restriction on 
plaintiffs' right to use their property in manners which otherwise comply with zoning 
laws and building ordinances without compensation to them is improper. The courts 
order has that effect and is therefore unconstitutional. 
The constitutional doctrine has particular application to the case of a spite 
fence. Because a private property owner can generally u£e his property as he sees fit 
(see Schulz v. Quintana, 576 P.2d 855 (Utah, 1978), the right to limit use of the property 
without compensation is restricted. In Baillargeon v. Press, 11 Wash. App. 59, 521 P.2d 
746 (Wash. App. 1974), the court found that restriction of a property ownerTs rights 
regarding property in the presence of any motive other than malice arises to a 
constitutional deprivation of property without due process of law. 
The court's order is additionally overbroad in that it restricts any structure 
erected between the premises which exceeds the height of the wall. This restriction has 
been imposed in an area £oned M-l where improvements could otherwise be built right to 
the property line as high as 80 feet high. The court's injunction additionally goes beyond 
the relief prayed for in plaintiffs' Complaint. Plaintiffs therein requested only removal 
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of the fences to comply with city ordinances. At trial it was stipulated that the 
improvements complied with city ordinances, yet the court chose, in spite of ample 
evidence of a motive other than spite for erection of the partitions, to order their 
removal and further restrict construction of additional improvements exceeding the 
height of the cinder block wall between the two houses. Nowhere in the Settlement 
Stipulation was there any provision that no improvement would be erected in defendants' 
side yard higher than the cinder block wall. The matter is not addressed. The law with 
respect to spite fences does not sanction such a broad order. Defendants are deprived of 
the use of their property without any compensation and the result of the injunction is 
therefore unconstitutional. The injunction should be dissolved and the case remanded for 
new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants were deprived of a fair trial in this action by virtue of the court's 
failure to instruct the jury that no implied right to light, air or view exists. The jury was 
thus free to speculate that such right existed despite overwhelming authority to the 
contrary. Indeed, it was the deprivation of light, air and view that plaintiffs claimed as 
their greatest injury. 
The Settlement Stipulation between the parties governs the construction of a 
cinder block wall. The partitions which were the subject of this action were not attached 
to the cinder block wall and were erected after its construction, according to defendants, 
in order to further protect their privacy. The court's failure to instruct on implied rights 
to light, view and air clearly prejudiced the defendants and warrants a reversal of the 
Judgment on Verdict and Injunction. 
The court failed to properly instruct the jury with respect to nuisance, 
particularly with regard to the impact of the spite fence doctrine on the general law of 
nuisance. Generally, a property owner may use his property as he sees fit so long as it 
does not cause harm to others. The court failed, despite defendants' exception to so 
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instruct the jury. Additionally, the law provides that no implied rights to light, air or 
view exist. Such rights must be expressly granted. Thus, mere interference with light, 
air or view cannot constitute grounds for nuisance where no duty to preserve the light, 
air or view of the plaintiff is mandated. The law has developed to require that removal 
of fences can be required and damages awarded only when it is determined that the fence 
was erected for no useful purpose but solely for spite. The courtfs failure to instruct the 
jury with respect to the property owner's rights to use his own property as he desires, 
providing harm, other than deprivation of light, air and view, is not caused to other 
adjoining landowners was error. The jury was likely so confused with respect to the 
applications of nuisance doctrine to this case that it could not be expected to properly 
apply the law. This confusion in the instructions and failure to give an instruction with 
respect to a property owner's rights to use his property was error and prejudiced the 
defendants. 
As a matter of law, the court erred in interpretation of the Settlement Stipulation 
and implied and permitted the jury to imply a covenant for light, view and air which was 
not within the four corners of the document. The Stipulation was drafted by plaintiff's 
counsel and should have been construed against them. In the presence of any ambiguity 
with respect to a grant of light, air or view over defendants' property, the defendants 
should have prevailed. The court could, as a matter of law, have ruled that no such right 
existed. Failure to do so was error. In effect the court has implied and permitted the 
jury to imply a right to light, air and view, contrary to the common law. 
The court made repeated evidentiary errors in excluding testimony offered by 
defendants on direct and cross-examination of witnesses, offered to demonstrate the 
proclivity of the plaintiffs for invading the privacy of the defendants. This testimony, if 
admitted, would have demonstrated that plaintiffs invaded defendants' privacy by peering 
over the wall, by climbing on the roof of the plaintiffs' residence to look over the cinder 
block wall, and by repeatedly calling governmental authorities including building 
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inspectors and police officers to investigate defendants. If the court had ruled properly, 
defendants would have established the reputation of the Behunins in the neighborhood for 
snoopiness and invasion of privacy. These items were excluded from evidence despite the 
fact that plaintiffs, on direct examination, put their reputation into issue by testifying 
that they felt their reputation in the neighborhood was good and by calling a character 
witness in Hetti Vandongen to testify about their reputation for being good neighbors and 
not invading the privacy of others. The court's refusal to permit defendants to rebut this 
testimony was error as the rebuttal went to credibility and further to establishing the 
affirmative aspects of defendants1 defenses regarding their privacy motive for erecting 
the partitions which were the subject of the action. The eourtTs evidentiary rulings were 
individually and cumulatively so prejudicial to the defendants' defense that a new trial is 
warranted. 
The effect of the court's injunction is to violate the constitutional rights of the 
defendants by depriving them of the use of their property without compensation. The 
court has effectively implied a light, air and view easement either under the theory of 
contract or under a theory of nuisance. As indicated above, both theories are erroneous 
in the presence of evidence that the motive of the defendants was to protect their 
privacy rather than solely to harass and damage plaintiffs. Given these errors it is 
appropriate that this court reverse the Judgment on Verdict and dissolve the injunction 
issued by the trial court. The matter should be remanded to the trial court for a new 
trial. 11 
DATED thisWQ^fday of February, 1985. 
Jeffrey^L, JSilvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT <3c SEGAL 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
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IN THE" DISTRICT "COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
O0o 
JOSEPH M. BEHUNIN and 
ARDELLA BEHUNIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
MARK GALLEGOS and 
ARLENE GALLEGOS, 
Defendants. 
1 PLAINTIFFS 
J EXHIBIT 
1 ^J66</0 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 236640 
-oOo-
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs named above, Joseph M. 
Behunin and Ardella Behunm, by and through through their 
attorneys, Adams, Kastmg & Anderson, and the Defendants, 
Mark Gallegos and Arlene Gallegos, by and through their 
attorney, Conne, Rappaport & Segal, and hereby agree and 
stipulate as follows: 
1. The parties each desire to settle and compromise 
the above capationed action and have entered into this Stipula-
tion to accomplish that end. 
2. Plaintiffs, upon the terms and conditions herein-
after set forth agree to cause this action to be dismissed with 
prejudice and upon the merits, upon the completion of the 
respective obligations of the parties as hereinafter set out, 
and further will cause and are agreeable to a dissolution of t^e 
Temporary Restraining Order which has arisen out of this action. 
3. Defendants, upon the terms and conditions herein-
after set forth, agree to cause their Counterclaim filed in this 
action to be dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, uoon 
the completion of the respective obligations of the parties 
as hereinafter set out. 
4. It is agreeable to the Plaintiffs that the 
Defendants be allowed to construct a cmderblock wall in 
accord with the dimensions hereinafter set out along the 
Western boundary of Plaintiffs' property (the Eastern boundary 
of Defendants' property). This wall is to be placed upon 
the foundation which was constructed by Defendants prior to 
the institution of this action against Defendants. The wall 
will be constructed of standard size and quality cmderblock. 
It shall commence on the Northwest corner of Plaintiffs' 
property and thence run in a southerly direction along the 
Western boundary line of Plaintiffs' property (the Eastern 
boundary line of Defendants' property) and shall be of a 
height not to exceed 4 feet including proper capping material. 
It shall continue at a height not exceeding 4 feet to the 
Northwest corner of Plaintiffs' residence. At the Northwest 
corner of Plaintiffs' residence, the wall shall be increased 
to a height not to exceed 5 feet including proper capping 
material, and shall continue at a height not exceeding 5 feet 
until it reaches the Southwest corner of Plaintiffs' residence. 
At the Southwest corner of Plaintiffs' residence, the wall shall 
be increased to a height not exceeding 7 feet including proper 
capping material and shall continue at a heiqht not exceeding 
7 feet to its termination point at the Southwest corner of 
Plaintiffs' property (the Southeast corner of Defendants' propertv) 
5. Defendants agree that the cmderblock wall will 
be constructed m accord with standard building specifications 
and this construction will include installation of proper 
footings, if necessary, and reinforcement bars to prevent the 
wall from collaspmg, sinking or tipping over on to Plaintiffs' 
property. 
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6. Defendants further agree to contact the Salt 
Lake City Building Inspector and request that he msoect the 
footings which were installed prior to the institution of 
this action so as to make certain that said footings have 
been properly installed and are of a proper depth and quality 
and have not in any way deteriorated durinq the pendency of 
this action. Defendants will so notify Plaintiffs through 
their attorney when this inspection has been completed and 
approval for further construction of the wall has been obtained. 
7. Defendants further agree to secure any and all 
necessary building permits from Salt Lake City or any other 
appropriate governmental authority so that the construction 
of said wall be in compliance with applicable Salt Lake City 
zoning ordinances and buildmq requirements. 
8. Defendants agree that the construction of said 
wall will commence as soon as it is reasonably possible after 
the existing footings have been inspected and after all necessary 
building permits have been obtained so that the completion of 
the wall will be effectuated as soon as is reasonably possible. 
9. Defendants agree that the contractor who will 
construct the wall will be duly licensed under the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
10. Defendants agree that upon completion of the 
construction of the wall, final approval will be secured from 
the Salt Lake City Building Inspector and proof of such approval 
will be furmshed_to Plaint i f f s' counsel by Defendants' counsel. 
11. Defendants agree not to damage Plaintiffs property 
during the time of construction of the wall, and in the event 
visible 
Defendants cause/damage to Plaintiffs' property and/or premises, 
Defendants will restore Plaintiff's property and/or premises 
and repair any such damage or injury at no cost to Plaintiffs. 
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12. Plaintiffs agree to remove the chain link fence which 
presently exists on the West side of Plaintiffs' property and it 
is agreeable to the parties that in the event Defendants' contrac-
tor, while in the process of constructing the vail, can give as-
sistance to Plaintiffs in so removing the chain link fence with 
the use of the equipment he may have available to him on Defen-
dants' property at the time of construction, he (Defendants' con-
tractor) will reasonably attempt to do so. 
13. It is further expressly agreed between the parties that 
the boundary line established by the East side of the wall upon 
its completion shall become the Western boundary line of the Plain-
tiffs ' property and the Eastern boundary line of Defendants' proD-
erty, and Defendants will claim no interest in the property on tae 
East side of the wall and Plaintiffs will claim no interest in the 
wall or in the property on the West side of the wall. 
14. The parties agree to work in a cooperative and reason-
able manner so that the obligations and responsibilities inposeu 
upon the respective parties under the terms of this Stipulation 
may be fulfilled. 
DATED this Jfi
 d a y o f juiy; 1977. 
X^ ~^*J<Lr\ ^ ^ r ^ 1 
Joseph M. Benunm 
Ardella Behunin 
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CONNfc, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
r Defendants 
^Tj^JL ,,jk£&^H>4-
MARK GALLEGOS 
•" ARLENE GALLEGOS J 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT^ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH M. BEHUNIN and 
ARDELLA BEHUNIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK GALLEGOS and 
ARLENE GALLEGOS, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CIVL NO. 236640 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, for our special 
verdict, answer the questions submitted as follows: 
1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
parties intended to be bound by the stipulation? 
YES X NO 
2. If you do find an intention to be bound by the stipulation 
do you further find from the terms of the stipulation and by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the parties intended to restrict 
obstructions to light, view and air along the boundary between their 
properties in a general way as well as to restrict the height of 
the wall? 
YES /\ NO 
3. If you find an implied intent not to obstruct the boundary 
do you find by a preponderance of the evidence the placement of the 
two (2) fences a breach of the terms of the stipulation? 
YES X SO 
4. If you find that the defendants breached the stipulation 
by the placement of barriers along the property line between the 
houses, what amount do you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
to be the actual damages incurred, if any? 
$ -—6? 
5. If you so find that the defendants breached the stipula-
tion and find by a preponderance of the evidence they did so malic-
i 
iously what amount do you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
as an amount of exemplary or punitive damages, if any? 
$ / ooo 
T 1 
I 
6. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the 
two fences constitute a nuisance? 
YES X NO 
/ \ — 
7. If you so find that the two fences constituted a nuisance, 
what amount do you find by clear and convincing evidence to be actual 
damages incurred, if any? 
$ /MO 
8. If you find that the fences erected by defendants constituted 
nuisance and by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants erecte 
the fences maliciously, what amount do you find by clear and convincing 
evidence as an amount of exemplary or punitive damages, if any? 
SIGNED and returned into court this / day of November, 
1983. 
'/?""' - w < - -
FOREMAN 
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STEVEN F. ALDER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1325 South Main, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Telephone: 486-4607 H. DIXON HWCLf'v 
**» DISC, coif 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOWEPUTT'TT^I 
- - E l l J 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH M. 3EHUNIN a n d 
ARDELLA 3EHUNIN, ] 
P l a i n t i f f s , ] 
v s . ] 
MARK GALLEGOS a n d 
ARLENE GALLEGOS, ] 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
I I N J U N C T I O N 
C j i v i l No . 2306G401 
The foregoing matter having been tried to a Jury on 
the 3rd and 7th of November 1983 and the Jury having returned a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs having asked 
the Court for an order granting injunctive relief based on the 
findings of the jury and the plaintiff's motion for injunctive 
relief having come on for hearing before the Court on the 21st day 
of December 1933 and the Court having heard the argument of 
counsel and being fully advised makes the follov/ing findings and 
order: 
1 . The placement of the various barriers betv/een the 
residences of the parties aDove the height of the existing walls 
and in front of the plaintiff's v/indov/s was a breach of the prior 
stipulation of the parties. 
2. The placement of the various barriers between the 
residences of the parties above the height of the existing wall 
and in front of the plaintiff's windows was intentional and 
malicious and constitutes a nuisance to the plaintiffs. 
3. The plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief. 
NOW THEREFORE THE DEFENDANTS ARE HEREBY ORDERED to 
remove the existing barriers between the residences other than the 
existing wall including the eight foot redwood fence now existing 
between the defendant's front fence line and the northeast corner 
of the defendants1 house and the eight foot redwood and fiber 
glass barrier along to the existing wall and to refrain from 
constructing, errecting or placing between the residences of the 
parties similar barriers to light, view and air in excess of the 
height of the existing wall between the residences. 
DATED this y day of K^K
 L , 1984. 
> J 
BY THE COURT 
H o n o r a b l e P e t e r F . Lea ry^ 
D i s t r i c t Cour t Judge 
ATTEST 
\ Ohr\ 
s 
APPENDIX D 
STEVEN F. ALDER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1325 South Main, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Telephone: 486-4607 
• • • • ^ 
9*9 0/S. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT fR-Mt 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH M. BEHUNIN and 
ARDELLA BEHUNIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
MARK,GALLEGOS and 
ARLENE GALLEGOS, 
Defendants. 
'Bkni Nt>.l£€tS' 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
Cijvil No. -236640 
The foregoing matter having been heard before a jury 
with the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding on the 3rd and 7th of 
November, 1983 and having been submitted to a jury on the 7th day 
of November 1983 and the Court and Jury having heard the testimony 
of witnesses and arguments of Counsel and the Jury having been 
instructed by the Court as to the law and its duties and having 
entered it!s verdict pursuant to specific interrogatories as 
attached hereto 
NOW THEREFORE the Court enters the following judgment 
in accordance with the Jury Verdict: 
1. The plaintiffs are awarded as general damages from 
the defendants for the nuisance created by the defendant, the sum 
of $1 ,000.00. 
2. The plaintiffs are awarded as punitive damages for 
their intentional and malicious acts creating a nuisance to the 
plaintiffs, the amount of $5,000.00. \/ 
DATED this y^ day of /'p ' / , 1984. 
^ / 
BY THfe-'COURT 
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APPENDIX .E 
INSTRUCTION NO. /S 
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent, or 
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of 
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of 
life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action. 
Such action may be brought by any person whose property is 
injuriously affebted, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened 
by nuisance. 
APPENDIX F 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
No one may make an unreasonable use of his own 
property to the material injury of his neighbors. The 
determination is whether the act or use is a reasonable exercise 
of the dominion which the property owner has by virtue of his 
ownership over his property having requard for all interests 
affected; his own and those of his neighbors and public policy. 
\PPENDIX G 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A fence is not lawful if it subserves some useful 
purpose, however slight, when the underlying intent and result aire 
to cause injury to the property of another. 
it 
APPENDIX HT 
INSTRUCTION NO. "2^{ 
A spite fence or structure is defined as one which is 
of no beneficial use or pleasure to the owner but was errected and 
is maintained by him for the purpose of annoying his neighbor or 
with malicious motive of injuring him by shutting out his air, 
light and views. 
APPENDIX I 
1 MR. ALDER: I HAVE NO OTHER OBJECTIONS EXCEPT FOR THE 
2 
8 
9 
10 
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RECORD I UNDERSTAND YOUR RULE ON POINT OF LAW. FOR THE 
3 I RECORD I VOICE MY OBJECTION TO THE INSERTION OF THE WORD 
4 "SOLELY" IN INSTRUCTION 21, I SUPPOSE IT IS, AND THAT I 
5 BELIEVE IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTE ON NUISANCE IN 
6 UTAH AND I JUST MAKE THAT OBJECTION FOR THE RECORD. I HAVE 
7 I NO FURTHER OBJECTIONS FOR THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
THE COURT: MR. SILVESTRINI? 
MR. SILVESTRINI: YOUR HONOR, THE ONLY EXCEPTION I 
HAVE IS TO THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 13, "A FENCE IS 
NOT LAWFUL IF IT SUBSERVES SOME UNUSEFUL PURPOSE." I 
12 , BELIEVE THAT INSTRUCTION ISN'T CONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW. \A 
13 I THE ROWLEY IF THERE IS SOME USEFUL PURPOSE, THEN THE FENCE 
u J IS NOT UNLAWFUL. 
15 . FURTHER, I OBJECT TO THE NEGATIVE CHARACTER IZA-
16 I TION OF THE INSTRUCTION. I BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE WORDED IN 
17 | A DIFFERENT SENSE TO IMPLY THAT IF THE IR--LANDOWNER MAY USE 
HIS PROPERTY AS HE SEES FIT SO LONG AS HE OBSERVED DUE 
REGARD TO SAFETY AND RIGHTS OF OTHERS,. THAT WAS EMBODIED 
IN AN UNNUMBERED INSTRUCTION WHICH WAS REFUSED BY THE COURT 
FOUND ON THE UTAH CASE OF SCHULZ V . QUINTAMA, 378 P.20 35 S 
THAT INSTRUCTION READS: 
"A LANDOWNER MAY USE HIS PROPERTY 
AS HE SEES FIT SO LONG AS HE OBSERVES A DUE REGARD 
FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS AFFECTED BY HIS PROPERTY 
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AND DOES NOT CAUSE UNREASONABLE HARD TO OTHERS 
AND THE VICINITY THEREOF." 
MY EXCEPTION GOES AS WELL TO INSTRUCTION 18 AND 
ALSO THE REQUEST THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT GIVEN. 
ADDITIONALLY, YOUR HONOR, WE EXCEPT TO THE FACT 
THAT THE COURT HAS FAILED TO GIVE ANY INSTRUCTION IN THIS 
CASE WITH REGARD TO THE EXISTENCE OR LACK OF EXISTENCE OF A 
LIGHT AND AIR EASEMENT UNDER UTAH LAW. WE OFFERED A NUMBER 
OF INSTRUCTIONS ON THAT ISSUE, SPECIFICALLY THE ONE FOUND 
IN THE NEVADA CASE OF BOYD V. MCDONALD, 40 8 P.2D 717 
INDICATING THAT A PROPERTY OWNER HAS NO IMPLIED RIGHT TO 
A LIGHT AND AIR EASEMENT. WE THINK THAT INSTRUCTION SHOULD 
BE GIVEN WITH REGARD TO THE NUISANCE CLAIMS IN THE MATTER. 
THE COURT: WELL, THE COURT'S POSITION ON THAT IS 
THAT UTAH STATUTE IS PREVAILING AND THE INSTRUCTION DEFINES 
WHAT A NUISANCE IS AND IT DOES NOT SELECT OUT ANY PARTICULAR 
TYPES OF CONDUCT SUCH AS A PERSON BEING REQUIRED TO HAVE 
EASEMENTS FOR LIGHT AND AIR. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER EXCEPTIONS? 
MR. SILVESTRINI: YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD EXCEPT TO THE 
PARAGRAPH NUMBER 5 OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT. THAT ONE GOES 
TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN REGARD TO BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
THE COURT: WELL, ALL RlwHT. WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER 
PART? WHAT ABOUT 6, 7, AND 8? 
MR. SILVESTRINI: NO OBJECTION TO 6, 7, OR 8, YOUR 
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1 I A ITM NOT SURE IF I CALLED OVER—YES, I DID. YES, 
I CALLED THE POLICE ON THE OBSCENE GESTURES ONE TIME. 
Q DO YOU KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE POLICE OFFICERS 
4 | GAVE MR. GALLEGOS ANY CITATION OR--
A NO, I DONfT. 
Q IS THAT THE ONLY TIME YOU CALLED THE POLICE TO 
COME OVER TO THE GALLEGOS RESIDENCE? 
A NO, SIR. 
Q HOW MANY OTHER TIMES WOULD YOU SAY YOU CALLED 
THE POLICE? 
A QUITE A FEW. 
THE COURT: WELL, WHAT IS THAT GOING TO DO IN HELPING 
TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM? 
MR, SILVESTRINI: YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE IT TENDS TO 
SHOW THE REASON WHY MY CLIENTS DESIRE THE PRIVACY, AND 
PRIVACY IS AN ISSUE. 
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17 MR. ALDER: I THINK WE NEED A FOUNDATION, YOUR HONOR, 
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AS TO WHAT--OBVIOUSLY WETRE NOT EXPLORING THE ENTIRE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE PARTIES, ANp THE ONLY PROBLEMS 
AT ISSUE HERE IS THE BARRIER WALL. IT HAS BEEN ADMITTED 
THERE ARE MANY--
THE COURT: I TAKE !T YOUTRE MAKJNG AN OBJECTION T H A T 
THE QUESTIONS ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF EX^MfNATION? 
MR. ALDER: THAT'S HOW TO PHRASE IT. 
THE COURT; THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. 
APPENDIX K 
1
 | PICTURE WAS TAKEN FROM? 
2
 ' A I THINK IT WAS TAKEN FROM THE FRONT CORNER OF 
3
 | OUR HOUSE 
4 Q ON YOUR PROPERTY? 
A YES. 
° I Q DO YOU KNOW WHAT DIRECTION YOU'RE LOOKING AT 
7
 IN THIS PICTURE? 
8
 A YOU'RE LOOKING FROM THE NORTH TO THE SOUTH. 
9
 Q DID YOU TAKE THAT PICTURE^ 
10 A NO, I DID NOT. 
11 Q DO YOU KNOW WHO TOOK IT? DO YOU KNOW WHO TOOK 
12 IT? 
13 A MY HUSBAND. 
M
 Q WHAT KIND OF PRIVACY PROBLEMS, IF ANY, DID YOU 
15 HAVE WITH THE BEHUNINS AFTER THE ERECTION OF THE CONCRETE 
16 BLOCK WALL? 
17
 I MR. ALDER: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. THE QUESTION IS 
AFTER THE ERECTION OF THE WALL AND OBVIOUSLY THE ISSUE IS 
WHAT WAS THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES AT THE TIME OF THE 
ERECTION OF THE WALL, AND SHE HAS ALREADY TESTIFIED SHE HAD 
NO PROBLEMS PRIOR TO THE ERECTION OF THE WALL. SO, I DON'T 
SEE WHAT RELEVANCE PRIVACY PROBLEMS HAVE TO THE WALL. 
MR. S1LVESTRINI: YOUR HONOR, IN DEFENSE OF THAT, 1 
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 INDICATE THAT I THINK THE REAL ISSUE IN THIS CASE- -PARTIES 
25 HAVE STIPULATED THAT THEY CAN BUILD A WALL. 
1 THE COURT: WELL, THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. 
2 MR. SILVESTRINI: OKAY. THE PROBLEM IN THIS CASE IS 
3 THE GREEN BARRIER AND THE WOOD BARRIER WHICH THEY ERECTED 
4 SUBSEQUENT TO THE ERECTION OF THE FENCE. 
5 THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. 
6 MR. SILVESTRINI: THE QUESTION IS A MATTER OF 
7 MOTIVATION. 
8 THE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU ASK HER ABOUT THAT. 
9 MR. SILVESTRINI: I WILL IF THE OBJECTION IS OVERRULED 
10 THE COURT: THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. 
11 Q (BY MR. SILVESTRINI) AFTER THE ERECTION OF THE 
12 CONCRETE BLOCK FENCE WERE THERE ANY OTHER STRUCTURES 
13 INSTALLED AT THE SAME TIME BY THE CONTRACTOR WHICH WOULD 
14 EXTEND UP AND ABOVE THE LEVEL OF THE CONCRETE BLOCK FENCE? 
15 A NO, NOT AT THE TIME THE CONTRACTOR DID IT; NO. 
16 Q FOR HOW LONG AFTER THE ERECTION OF THE CONCRETE 
17 FENCE WOULD YOU SAY THERE WAS NO BARRIER ABOVE THE LEVEL OF 
18 THE FENCE? 
19 A ABOUT FOUR MONTHS, THREE TO FOUR MONTHS. 
20 Q WHAT HAPPENED TO CHANGE THE LEVEL OF THE FENCE 
21 AFTER THREE OR FOUR MONTHS? 
22 A WELL, MR. BEHUNIN WAS ALWAYS COM IMG THROUGH 
23 BETWEEN THE HOUSE AND THE WALL AND LOOKING IN OUR YARD, AND 
24 ONE OTHER REASON IS WE'RE TRYING TO IMPROVE OUR PLACE AND 
25 THAT IS ON OUR PATIO. 
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APPENDIX L 
1 I REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. SILVESTRINI 
3 Q MRS. GALLEGOS, I SHOW YOU WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED 
4 AS EXHIBIT P-53 AND ASK YOU IF YOU CAN IDENTIFY THAT DOCUMENT 
5 IS THAT THE SETTLEMENT STIPULATION? 
6 A YES 
7 I Q ENTERED IN THIS CASE, IS IT NOT? 
8 l A YES. 
9 | Q YOU SIGNED THAT DOCUMENT? 
j 
10 i A YES. 
u | Q DO YOU KNOW WHO PREPARED THAT DOCUMENT? 
12 i A I BELIEVE BEHUNINS' ATTORNEY DID TALKING TO OUR 
13 | ATTORNEY, TOO. THE TWO OF THEM TALKING TOGETHER, BUT I 
14 i BELIEVE HE WROTE IT UP. 
15 | Q DO YOU KNOW WHO MR. AND MRS. BEHUNINS' ATTORNEY 
WAS? 
A KASTING. 
18 | Q OKAY. IT'S ON THAT DOCUMENT, ANYWAY, ISN'T IT? 
19 | A YES . KASTING. 
20 | Q YOU READ THAT DOCUMENT BEFORE YOU SIGNED IT, 
DIDN'T YOU? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q IS THERE ANYTHING IN THAT DOCUMENT GRANTING ANY 
KIND OF A RIGHT IN THE BEHUNINS' TO Li'GHT OR AIR? 
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1 THE COURT; THIS IS NOT PROPER REDIRECT. YOU HAVE 
2 BEEN OVER THAT BEFORE ON YOUR DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
3 MR. SILVESTRINI: YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE THIS--
4 THE COURT: I HAVE RULED, COUNSEL. 
5 MR. SILVESTRINI: YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE--
6 THE COURT: COUNSEL, I RULED ON IT,. 
7 MR. SILVESTRINI: ALL RIGHT. NO FURTHER QUEST IONS. 
8 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. ALDER: 
10 Q YOU SAY YOU'RE IMPROVING YOUR LOT, AND I WAS 
11 WONDERING IF YOU WOULD DRAW FOR ME THE SIZE OF YOUR LOT, 
12 SIDE OF YOUR HOUSE, HOW IT IS SITUATED, *ND THE IMPROVEMENTS 
13 A YOU MEAN DO IT AT THIS TIME? 
14 Q YES. 
15 A DO YOU WANT THE DIMENSIONS OF OUR PROPERTY? 
16 Q IF YOU KNOW THEM, THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL. 
17 A IT'S 126. THIS IS NORTH. THIS IS SOUTH. THIS 
18 IS 126 FEET. THIS WAY IT'S 90 FEET. 
19 NOW, YOU WANT OUR HOUSE? 
20 Q YES. LOCATE IT AS IT IS LOCATED ON YOUR 
21 PROPERTY. MAYBE YOU SHOULD PUT THE OTHER PROPERTY LINE. 
22 | A TH I S I S THE CINDER BLOCK WAUL. THIS IS THE 
23 j PORCH. THIS IS THE CINDER BLOCK WALL. THIS IS THE PORCH, 
! 
24 I PORCH hit RE . 
25 Q WOULD YOU DRAW FOR ME THE WINDOW OPENINGS ON 
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APENDIX M 
1 j THE WITNESS; YES. 
2 MR. ALDER; I ASK FOR FURTHER FOUNDATION AS TO 
3 RELATIONSHIP, HOW YOU OBSERVED IT. 
4 j Q (BY MR. SILVESTRINI) IN WHAT MANNER DID YOU 
OBSERVE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GALLEGOS AND THE 
6 j BEHUNINS? 
7 A IN WHAT MANNER? I NEED THAT FURTHER CLARIFIED. 
8 Q WHAT KIND OF THINGS HAVE YOU BEEN PRIVY TO IN 
9 | TERMS OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE GALLEGOS AND BEHUNINS? 
1Q A WHAT HAVE I OBSERVED? THE HATF.I ELD-MCCOY TYPE 
n I FIGHTING GOING ON. 
I Q YOU OBSERVED THAT FROM YOUR HOUSE LOOKING 
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17 I Q YOU HAVE SEEN WHAT'S GOING ON PRETTY MUCH ACROSS 
THE STREET, PEOPLE GOING TO AND FROM. 
A YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: WELL, COUNSEL, ASK A QUESTION AND DON'T 
TRY AND TESTIFY. 
0 (BY MR. SILVESTRINI) WHAT KIND OF THINGS DID YOU 
OBSERVE MR. AND MRS. BtHUMIN DOING W I Tj M RESPECT TO THE 
GALLEGOS PROPERTY? 
OUTSIDE? 
A YES. 
Q SO, YOU--
A AND ALSO IN THE BACK OF GALLEGOS' YARD. 
19§££ 
FRONT OF THE CONCRETE FENCE AND LEAN OVER AND LOOK INTO THE 
GALLEGOS' FRONT YARD TO SEE WHO WAS GOING TO THEIR DOOR. 
I HAVE OBSERVED THE PEACE SYMBOL BEING PASSED BACK AND 
FORTH BY THE PARTIES, AND I HAVE OBSERVED HUNDREDS OF TIMES 
OF JOE PULLING OUT OF THE DRIVEWAY, SLOWLY DRIVING AROUND 
THE BLOCK TO OBSERVE THE THREE FENCED, THE CHAINLINK FENCED 
AREAS OF THE GALLEGOS' YARD ANYTIME ANYTHING WAS GOING ON 
THERE. 
Q DID YOU EVER HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT THE 
GALLEGOS* BACKYARD WHERE WATER AND WALL WERE AT ISSUE? 
A YES, SIR. MY CAMERA WAS USED TO TAKE THE 
PICTURE. 
Q I SHOW YOU WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED AS EXHIBIT D-45 
MND MSK IF YOU CAN TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT TH/nT PICTURE. 
A YES. I RECEIVED A CALL ONE--! BELIEVE IT WAS 
SATURDAY MORNING, IF I'M NOT MISTAKEN. 
Q DO YOU REMEMBER ABOUT WHEN SATURDAY MORNING? 
A NO, 1 CANNOT. IT'S BEEN THREE TO FIVE YEARS 
AGO, I WOULD SAY. 
MR. ALDER: YOUR HONOR, I REALLY DON'T OBJECT TO THOSE 
QUESTIONS EXCEPT THAT I THINK IT'S A WASTE 0^ THE COURT'S 
TIME. I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY RELEVANCE TO THE WATER 
MATTERS AT HAND. HE HAb ALREADY BEEN OVER THIS A MILLION 
TIMES. WE DON'T KNOW WHY IT MATTERS THAT THE HOSE IS 
RUNNING OR IF THE WALL WAS WET UNDFRMEATH AND WATER--!! 
1 SEEMS TO JUST WASTE THE COURT'S TIME, THIS TYPE OF THING 
2 MR. SILVESTRINI: I ASK. THAT WE CAN APPROACH THE BENCH 
3 THE COURT: NO. THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. 
4 I Q (BY MR. SILVESTRINI) DID YOU OBSERVE WATER IN 
5 | THE BACKYARD OF THE GALLEGOS PROPERTY? 
6 I A YES 
7 I Q CAN YOU RECALL WHERE THE WATER WAS FROM? 
8 i MR. ALDER: OBJECTION. I BELIEVE THE OBJECTION WAS 
9 | SUSTAINED. 
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THE COURT: THE OBJECTION WAS SUSTAINED. 
Q (B.Y MR. SILVESTRINI) DID YOU EVER KNOW MR. AND 
MRS. BEHUNIN TO EXPRESS AN INTEREST BY THEIR CONDUCT IN THE 
COMINGS AND GOINGS IN YOUR YARD? 
10 
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14 | MR. ALDER; OBJECTION. 
15 , THE COURT: SUSTAINED 
16 I MR. SILVESTRINI: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR 
17 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
1 8 BY MR. ALDER 
19 I Q YOU SAID YOU ARE A PROPERTY OWNER IN THE AREA 
A YES . 
Q HAS YOUR PROPERTY EVER BEEN CONSIDERED A 
NUISANCE? 
A isO. 
Q NEVER BEEN CHARGED WITH ANY VIOLATION AS A 
25 PROPERTY OWNER ON EUCLID AVENUE? 
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